Groves 1

Winning Wirzburger and Defeating the Blaine Amendments:
Arguing Present Efficacy Instead of Past Intent

(Massachusetts’ Constitution, circa 1780)

Brendan Groves

Faculty Advisor:
Professor Andrew Benton
President, Pepperdine University
5 December 2005

Groves 2
Abstract
The case of Wirzburger v. Galvin, currently on a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court, may set the tone for all
religious discrimination cases in the future. Massachusetts’
constitutional amendments that proscribe any citizen
initiatives from either dealing with religion in general or
attempting to repeal the states Blaine Amendment are at
issue in the case. Petitioner’s counsel, the Becket Fund,
rightly views this case as paramount in the long-march to
victory over the anti-Catholic Blaine Amendments still
codified in 37 state constitutions. However, they have lost
almost every stage of the case.
This article argues that Wirzburger and other anti-Blaine
litigation should experience a paradigm shift. No longer
should litigators argue the Blaine’s “past intent” to
discriminate against religious persons, and particularly
Catholics. The 2004 Locke v. Davey decision confirms the
Supreme Court’s unwillingness to affirm the animus behind
the Blaine Amendments. Wirzburger and future cases
should pin their claims upon the higher ground of
nonpersecution, outlined in the 1993 Lukumi Babalu Aye
case. The principles of neutrality, general applicability and
non-exemption serve as fundamental tenets of this
argumentative direction. This article argues that these
tenets boost the strength of petitioner’s Constitutional
claims.
Wirzburger must be won. The veil of anti-Catholic
discrimination must finally be lifted and the bigoted
Blaine’s repealed. Only by pinning anti-Blaine litigation
upon the doctrine of nonpersecution and arguing present
efficacy instead of past intent, will these hopes materialize.
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I. Introduction
Grand notions of America’s perfection have largely dissipated, replaced by a
realistic view of the sins of the state. Perhaps this is beneficial. No nation is perfect, and
America’s past and present certainly fails to defy this rule. Of all America’s sins,
discrimination seems to top the list. In politics (white males only as eligible voters),
race-relations (de facto discrimination spiraling into the present), and even international
relations (imperialistic domination in the Philippines, Cuba and Hawaii, et al), the United
States’ record is stained. Enter religion. The Constitution’s lofty First Amendment
preventing Congress from making any law “respecting an establishment of religion,” or
“prohibiting the free exercise” of any US citizen crafts an aura of protection around both
religion and religious persons.1 Despite these words, no reasonable person can deny the
stains of discrimination streaking through the history of religion in America. This paper
focuses not on religious discrimination in general, but towards one particular faith—
Catholicism.2
Anti-Catholic animus reached its apogee in the United States during the 1870s.
Before and after this period, at least 37 state provisions were passed that aimed

1

See the First Amendment, United States Constitution. I refer here to an aura of protection, to avoid using
Thomas Jefferson’s idea of a wall between the church and state. Scholarship reveals, in my opinion, that
Jefferson’s words were misquoted by Justice Black in the 1947 case of Everson v. Board of Education of
Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) and continue to be a misnomer in modern jurisprudence.
2
Gregory C. Sisk, How Traditional and Minority Religions Fare in the Courts: Empirical Evidence From
Religious Liberty Cases, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1021 (2005).
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specifically at debilitating the effect of a growing American Catholic influence.3
Commonly called the Blaine Amendments after the sponsor of the failed federal Anti-Aid
Amendment, these provisions proscribe any and all state funding from flowing to
religious or “sectarian” institutions. Protestants, along with strict separationists, sought
these provisions as a knee-jerk reaction to Catholic requests for parochial school funding.
Open anti-Catholic animus operates pervasively throughout not only the founding of
these Anti-Aid Amendments, but in their present selective (and discriminatory)
enforcement.4
Those seeking to repeal state Blaine Amendments face an arduous uphill battle.
The case with which this paper deals, centers not on the constitutionality of the blighted
Blaines themselves but upon discriminatory exclusionary measures designed to safeguard
them. Wirzburger v. Galvin, currently on a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court,
presents Blaine opponents’ best chance to begin the battles leading to a legal victory.5
Much like the stair-step cases paving the path to Thurgood Marshall’s penultimate
triumph in the Brown v. Board of Education decision6, Wirzburger may carve out the first
jurisprudential niche in the cliff-face of the Blaine Amendments. To do this, however,
the arguments advanced by Petitioner Susan Wirzburger’s counsel, the Becket Fund,
must be extraordinarily effective. The Becket Fund has lost every stage of the case.7
Petitioners seek Massachusetts to allow the Wirzburger proposed amendment freeing
3

Frederick Mark Gedicks, Reconstructing the Blaine Amendments, 2 First. Amend. L. Rev. 86 (2004). A
broader history of the Blaine Amendments will later be offered.
4
See Richard W. Garnett, The Theology of the Blaine Amendments, 1 First. Amend. L. Rev. (2003).
5
Michael Wirzburger, et al., v. William F. Galvin, Secretary of State, et al., No. 04-1625, 2005 U.S. App.
LEXIS (1st Cir. Jun. 24, 2005).
6
See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For an example of a “stair-step” case that led to
Brown, see Sweatt v. Painter, 339 US 629 (1950).
7
The 1998 federal court order that allowed Wirzburger’s petition to be circulated during the pending legal
battle may count as a victory. See The Becket Fund, Wirzburger v. Galvin (2005),
<http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/case/6.html.>

Groves 6
public aid to “students attending private schools, regardless of the schools’ religious
affiliation”8 to make the initiative ballot over the objections of the Religious Exclusion
and the Anti-Aid Exclusion.9 The recent First Circuit loss amplifies the necessity of
winning in the Supreme Court, should the writ of certiorari be accepted. Past arguments
seem rather anachronistic. In the eyes of the courts, the Becket Fund’s claims have been
purposed but not exceedingly powerful. This paper presents my humble suggestions to
steer the legal ship aiming at winning the Wirzburger case and eventually striking-down
all state Blaine Amendments in a slightly different direction.
Past failures in Wirzburger and other anti-Blaine efforts center upon attacking the
Blaine’s past discriminatory intent instead of focusing on their present discriminatory
operation. The Blaine Amendments should be ruled unconstitutional simply upon an
examination of their present implementation with only little evidence of their past
intentions. The modern judicial branch seems hesitant to track down a new menace to the
Free Exercise and Equal Protection clauses.

Locke v. Davey (2004) illustrates the

Rehnquist court’s unwillingness to enter uncharted waters and acknowledges the animus
behind the Blaine Amendments.10 Though the Supreme Court now hosts four Catholic
members (including Chief Justice Roberts) and may receive another11, their propensity to
overturn Blaine’s upon historical discrimination alone is at best, doubtful.
8

Of the

(Pl. Pet. at 4).
Both Exclusions are housed in Article 48, section 2 of the Massachusetts Constitution. These exclusions
prohibit any initiatives aimed at either repealing the Anti-Aid Amendment (Article 18) or discussing
religion in general from the state initiative process.
10
See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). The Court refused to accept that Washington’s Blaine
Amendment was passed in a spirit of anti-Catholic animus. Future decisions will undoubtedly utilize this
case as a strong precedent. Wirzburger must forge ahead, determined to delineate a new era of Blaine
jurisprudence—an era unfettered by failures to display the animus inherent in the Blaine’s. Of any case,
though, Wirzburger has the best chance of revealing the bias inherent in the passing of these amendments.
The Becket Fund has done an excellent job of showcasing this throughout the case’s history.
11
The high Court’s Catholic Justices: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, Justice
Kennedy, and upon his successful confirmation, Judge Alito.
9
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Catholic justices, Justice Thomas remains most likely to side with Blaine opponents,
airing this possibility in the plurality opinion of Mitchell v. Helms.12 Whether or not the
Catholic Justices would assuredly act against the Blaine Amendments, anti-Blaine
litigation must ensure that it takes a road leading to long-term and not simply momentary
success.
This road should be constructed from arguments dealing with efficacy and not
original intent. The Becket Fund has based much of its Wirzburger claims upon the
latter, but for good reason. More evidence depicts anti-Catholic animus in the passage
both of Massachusetts’ 1855 Anti-Aid Amendment and 1917-1918 Exclusions than those
of perhaps any other state. However, not every case will be able to follow this course.
Future plaintiffs, I believe, should only sparingly beg the Court to treat Blaine’s as it
treated vestigial Jim Crow laws.13 The Blaine Amendments are a difficult beast to master.
They are facially neutral towards religion, seem to sanctify (if not widen) the separation
of church and state, and theoretically treat each religion equally.14 My recommendations
take this reality into account. Indeed, opponents must do more than simply focus their
arguments on the Blaines’ current discrimination. Besides this tactic, litigants should pin
their claims upon relatively recent spheres of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence:
neutrality, general applicability, and nonpersecution. Constitutional claims implicating
the Free Exercise Clause and the Equal Protection clause should be refracted through
these three propositions.15 In this way, the paramount case of Wirzburger v. Galvin will
be won and the path paved to the eventual demise of the other 36 state Blaine
12

Mitchell v. Helms. 530 US 793 (2000).
See (Pl. Pet. at 3).
14
This is not the case in Wirzburger. The Plaintiffs rightfully—and forcefully—showcase the selective and
discriminatory modern enforcement of Massachusetts Anti-Aid Amendment. See (Pl. Pet. at 8-9).
15
Of the First and 14th Amendments, respectively.
13
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Amendments.16 I first examine the Blaine Amendments at large, then delve into the
Supreme Court’s recent religion and equal protection jurisprudence, while finally
discussing the specifics of my proposed path for Wirzburger and explicating the
constitutional provisions at play.

II. An Elucidation of the Blaine Amendments: Discriminatory Then and Now

The Blaine Amendments were not born in a day. They are the result of a longstanding American Protestant17 aversion to the Catholic faith. According to Arthur
Schlesinger, Sr., anti-Catholic “prejudice” is the “deepest bias in the history of the
American people.”18 Professor Noah Feldman explains that this sentiment stems from
more than a mere distrust of Catholic sympathies.19

19th century American Protestants

fancied themselves to form an amalgamated conception of “nonsectarianism: the claim
that there were moral principles shared in common by all Christian sects, independent of
their particular theological beliefs.”20 Catholic sectarianism, then, represented a threat to
the inculcation of morals to the nation’s youth. And the threat only grew. The Catholic
population in America spiraled from 341,000 in the 1830s to over 1.3 million by 1854.21
Common schools overflowed with Catholic immigrants. Pupils were subjected to moral
instruction that often consisted of reading the King James Bible. Protestants proclaimed
16

Excluding, perhaps, those Blaine Amendments that do not discriminate now and allow equal opportunity
access to funding.
17
The aversion of American Protestants to Catholics certainly stems from the turmoil of Luther’s
Reformation and the resulting 30 years war. Not surprisingly, such long-standing animosity did not die
upon reaching the American coast line. I say this to note that my examination of the Blaine’s history
excludes approximately 300 years of general sectarian hatred.
18
Qtd. in Richard W. Garnett, The Theology of the Blaine Amendments 63 (2003).
19
See Noah Feldman, Divided by God 61-71 (2005).
20
Id. at 61 (2005). Note: Nonsectarianism, as we shall see, did—and does—not include Catholicism.
21
Id. at 63 (2005).
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this practice holy and altogether necessary; Catholics found the practice unholy and
altogether appalling. Catholic students were not allowed to read the Church-sanctioned
Douay-Reims translation and were admonished by Church leadership to abstain from
school readings of the supposedly “nonsectarian” King James Bible.22 The American
Catholic Church leadership eventually began to fight back against the majoritarian
Protestant establishment.

Catholic parents were exhorted to send their children to

parochial schools, no matter how great the financial burden. Soon, the Catholic Church
and parochial-school parents began knocking on state-house doors seeking funding for
their schools. Their argument was simple. All Protestants received a government-funded
public education which offers them a religious (e.g., “moral”) education.

Catholic

children should receive at least as much. Yet it was not to be. Most Protestants, as
Professor Richard W. Garnett illustrates, simply felt that parochial schooling lacked the
Republican emphasis so desperately needed in a Republic.23 Schools are more than
houses of learning; they are the very foundation of successful democracies. Catholics
schools were continually denied funding, yet the calls for religious equity only grew
louder. Unfortunately, the calls against this type of equity prevailed.
Political solutions were needed to hedge against Catholic funding requests.
Legislators realized that barring aid only to Catholic recipients was out of the question.24
The 18th article of Massachusetts’ Constitution, indirectly at issue in Wirzburger,

22

Id. at 63 (2005).
Richard W. Garnett, The Theology of the Blaine Amendments, 1 First. Amend. L. Rev., 76 (2003). Note
the following thought: “In the words of the father of the Common School Movement, Horace Mann, “it
may be an easy thing to make a republic; but it is a very laborious thing to make Republicans.” See 1 The
People Shall Judge: Readings in the Formation of American Policy (Univ. of Chi. Ed., 1949).
24
I find the facial neutrality of the First Blaine’s quite astounding, considering that the 14th amendment had
not yet been constructed. Example: Massachusetts’ Anti-Aid Amendment was passed in 1855. The 14th
Amendment was ratified on July 9, 1868.
23
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provides an excellent example of the final solution.25 The Know-Nothing party won
control of Massachusetts in the early 1850s. Implementing their agenda to “Americanize
America,” they launched an “attack on the civil and political rights of the foreign-born
and Roman Catholics that went beyond anything else found in the country.”26
Overwhelming political capital led to the proposal and ratification of the Anti-Aid
Amendment that prohibited any state funds from flowing to schools administered by a
“religious sect.”27 Of course, the Amendment’s carefully crafted language did not outlaw
public funds from supporting any nonsectarian religious schools, to include public
schools.28 And so it began. This original Amendment was expanded and entrenched in
the 1917-1918 Massachusetts Constitutional Convention. Delegates revised Article 18 to
proscribe funding for any sectarian institution. The two exclusionary principles at issue
were passed and ratified, forming a protective force field around the Anti-Aid
Amendment.
Well before Massachusetts’ exclusions became reality, US Senator James G.
Blaine of Maine proposed an 1875 federal constitutional amendment prohibiting public
funds from being controlled by any “religious sect.”29

Most scholars believe that

Senator Blaine sought this Amendment as a means to obtain increased political capital by
playing on the anti-Catholic sentiment inherent in the minds of many Americans. His

25

See Richard Fossey & Robert LeBlanc, Vouchers for Sectarian Schools after Zelman: Will the First
Circuit Expose Anti-Catholic Bigotry in the Massachusetts’ Constitution?, 193 West’s Educ. L. Rep. 343
(Jan. 13, 2005).
26
John Mulkern, The Know-Nothing Party in Massachusetts: The Rise and Fall of a People’s Movement
67, 102 (1990). Qtd in (Pl. Pet. at 6).
27
Article 18 of the Massachusetts’ Constitution. Qtd. in (Pl. Pet. at 6).
28
(Pl. Pet. at 6).
29
Richard Fossey & Robert LeBlanc, Vouchers for Sectarian Schools after Zelman: Will the First Circuit
Expose Anti-Catholic Bigotry in the Massachusetts’ Constitution?, 193 West’s Educ. L. Rep. 343, 351 (Jan.
13, 2005).
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Amendment received overwhelming support from the House of Representatives but
failed in the Senate. Failure only incensed nativist advocates to push the Blaine’s in the
next forums, the states. More than 34 Blaine-style Amendments were passed in the years
following the 1875 failure of the federal initiative. Congress, unable to pass their own
Blaine amendment, stipulated that “newly admitted states…adopt some form of an antisectarian amendment.”30 Some accounts suggest that as many as 47 Blaine provisions
exist in the United States.31
These provisions are not without effect. Many observers commonly overlook, for
instance, the galvanizing effect Anti-Aid Amendments (and their catalyzing nativist
mentality) had on American jurisprudence. The court decision commonly understood to
set the boundaries between the church and state, Everson v. Board of Education (1947),
was authored by a person of anti-Catholic sentiments himself—Justice Hugo T. Black.32
Constitutional law students will note that Everson espouses the mantra of strict
separationism, even as it allows New Jersey to partially subsidize the cost of public
transportation to private, even parochial schools. Though the Supreme Court authorized
this allowance, numerous states rely upon their Blaine Amendments to set the boundaries
between the church and state. Seven states, in the years following Everson, actually
struck down nearly analogous transportation-funding requests in light of their anti-Aid

30

Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious Persecution, 26 Berkeley
Electronic Press, 24 (2003), available at <http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/26> (accessed 12 November
2005). Professor Duncan discusses the Congress’ requirement for states to pass such amendments as a
stipulation of state Enabling Acts.
31
The Wall Street Journal, Opinion Journal section in the Editorial Pages, The Next Voucher Battleground,
(Aug. 7 2001), available at < http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110002095>
(accessed 12 November 2005).
32
See Richard W. Garnett, The Theology of the Blaine Amendments, 1 First. Amend. L. Rev. at 66 (2003).
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Amendments.33

What is the root of such strict separationism? Undoubtedly, it is the

Blaine Amendments. John Courtney Murray condemns this separationist mantra as an
“irredeemable piece of sectarian dogmatism,” carried over from the days of the Blaines.34
Thus, the air of anti-Catholic animus pervades even the modern interpretation of
established case-law and the minds of many of America’s most revered jurists.35 The
analysis of Wirzburger v. Galvin must be exacted with this understanding in mind,
though as I have already noted, it should not comprise the central tenet of the Plaintiff’s
argument.36

III. The Evolving Doctrine of Nonpersecution: Non-exemption, Neutrality, and General
Applicability

Even as anti-Catholicism pervades the Blaine Amendments, it is too weak a
ground for Blaine opponents to stand upon. A single Supreme Court decision declaring
that past animus plays no part in the present would sink the hopes of many private school
parents currently vying for state funding. I now discuss recent areas of jurisprudence that
have been catalyzed through the Supreme Court’s decisions in Employment Division,
Oregon Department of Human Resources v. Smith37 and Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye v. City of Hialeah38. Justice Kennedy refers to the broad “principle that government

33

See Thomas Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 Loy. Chic. L. Jour. 121, 128
(2001), (citing Bd. Of Educ. V. Antone, 384 P.2d 911 (Okla. 1963).
34
Qtd. in Richard W. Garnett, The Theology of the Blaine Amendments, 79 (2003).
35
Justice Douglas is also said to have been very anti-Catholic. His father was greatly influenced by the
writings of Paul Blanchard in the 1940s on the corruption of Catholic power.
36
A more detailed examination of exactly what constitutional and derived provisions are impeded by the
Blaine Amendments, and especially by Massachusetts’ exclusions, follows later in the analysis.
37
Employment Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
38
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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may not enact laws that suppress religious belief or practice,” as that of “nonpersecution”
in the majority opinion in Lukumi.39 The Becket Fund and other litigators should found
their attacks upon this principle, as it applies to the tenets of non-exemption, neutrality
and general applicability.
Non-exemption must be analyzed first, as it sets the stage for the discussion of the
other two issues.

Its roots stem from the “nineteenth century conflict between the

Mormon Church and the territorial laws of the United States prohibiting polygamy.”40
The case of Reynolds v. United States41 held that Mormon teachings of polygamy did not
exempt followers, pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause, from generally applicable antipolygamy legislation.

Legislator’s gained an increased ability to restrict the Free

Exercise Clause rights of citizens if the burdens created were only incidental and the
result of generally applicable laws. The next hundred years of jurisprudence brought an
increased attention to Free Exercise rights, especially after they were incorporated to the
states in the 1940 decision of Cantwell v. Connecticut.42 States were free, in this case, to
impose time, manner and place restrictions on solicitation through “general and nondiscriminatory legislation.”43 The Court’s words highlight the nexus of non-exemption
and its fellow principles, neutrality and general applicability.
As seen from this brief non-exemption analysis, these next two tiers play a
fundamental role in the discussion of religious liberties. Neutrality often appears
nebulous, as Douglas Laycock notes: “[t]hose who think that neutrality is meaningless

39

Id. at 520 (1993).
Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s Laws, at 48 (2003).
41
See Reynolds v United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). This is the Supreme Court’s first major religion
decision.
42
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
43
Id. at 305-10 (1940).
40
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have a point. We can agree on the principle of neutrality without having agreed on
anything at all.”44 But it means at least that Government may not “take sides” in religion,
favoring or disfavoring a particular faith or religion in general. General applicability
refers to legislation that addresses a governmental interest in a manner which is aimed at
securing the public good with a means that does not aim—or place heavy incidental
burdens upon—the rights of citizens. The controversial Smith decision elucidates this
truth. Smith dealt with the refusal of Oregon to offer unemployment benefits for two
persons fired for injesting peyote an as aspect of the worship in the Native American
Church.45 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, emphasized that the Court has never
“held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise
valid law prohibiting conduct that a state is free to regulate.”46 Oregon’s unemployment
laws were not tailored to restrict upon the religious beliefs or practices of its citizens.
Scalia concedes that Petitioner’s rights have certainly been restricted, but he refuses to
open the judicial flood-gates to complaints from individuals claiming exemptions from
neutral and general regulations.

One must note that Petitioner’s rights were only

incidentally restricted. Should Oregon have promulgated laws directly burdening or
impeding the free exercise of the Native American Church, a decision more akin to
Lukumi would have unfolded.
Scalia’s words in Smith apply directly to Wirzburger and future anti-Blaine
litigation. He remarks that citizens seeking religious accommodation should primarily

44

Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DePaul L.
Rev. 993, 994 (1990). Qtd in Kyle Duncan, supra at 67.
45
See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Petitioners were discharged for work-related
“misconduct.”
46
Id. at 873.
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seek “accommodation…[in] the political process” instead of the courts.47 Massachusetts’
Exclusions directly restrict Susan Wirzburger and others from seeking political
accommodation. Due to her strong Catholic faith, her lack of funds, and her wish to
provide her children with a religious education unavailable in public schools, she seeks
limited governmental support. Yet her claims are denied. In fact, her wishes are
prevented from even being heard, proscribed by archaic Exclusions that force religious
persons to clear a steep hurdle to participate in the state initiative process. Justice Scalia
unequivocally condemns this type of content-based regulation in Smith:
It would be true, we think (although no case of ours has involved the point), that a
State would be “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” if it sought to ban such
acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only
because of the religious beliefs that they display.48
In 2000, the Supreme Court galvanized the principle of neutrality in the landmark
decision of Mitchell v. Helms.49 The majority opinion breathes a breath of fresh air into
the doctrine of neutrality, by offering a brief analysis and definition of its modern
applicability. The Establishment Clause receives the most attention in the case, with the
declaration that “if the government, seeking to further some legitimate secular purpose,
offers aid on the same terms, without regard to religion, to all who adequately further that
purpose,” than distributed aid only furthers “that secular purpose.”50 Thus, governments
may achieve secular legislative ends even through organizations or persons with religious
purposes.
47

Moreover, the Becket Fund achieved a tremendous victory with Justice

Id. at 890.
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). Wirzburger may be the case that involves this
point.
49
See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
50
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 795 (2000).
48
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Thomas’ harangue of Blaine Amendments in the main opinion.51 Thomas wrote that
Blaines’ have a “shameful pedigree” and added that “it was an open secret that
"sectarian" was code for "Catholic."52 Yet it is his discourse upon neutrality that matters
most.
Lukumi Babalu was decided some seven years prior to Mitchell, but its display of
the intermingled nature of the three issues at hand is remarkable. Justice Kennedy
applied Smith standards to evaluate a Hialeah, Hawaii ordinance banning animal
sacrifice. The Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., was therefore denied the right to
practice its religion within the city. Church members immediately filed a suit, alleging
the abrogation of their Free Exercise Rights. The Supreme Court, with Justice Kennedy
at the helm, centered their examination upon the principles of neutrality and general
applicability. Neutrality did not exist, according to the Court, “if the object of [the] law
is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation.”53 Laws
violate “general applicability” when, “through neutral in their terms, through their design,
construction, or enforcement [they] target the practices of a particular religion for
discriminatory treatment.”54 A vibrant nexus exists between these two principles, as
distinguished by Justice Kennedy:
Neutrality and general applicability are [interrelated], and, as becomes apparent in
this case, failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has
not been satisfied. A law failing to satisfy these requirements must be justified by

51

The Becket Fund submitted an amicus brief in support of this finding.
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 793-800 (2000).
53
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
54
Id. at 558. From Justice Scalia’s concurrence with Chief Justice Rehnquist.
52
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a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to advance that
interest.55
Lacking even one of these tenets necessitates strict scrutiny. And yet what has occurred
should one of these principles be violated? What occurs upon breaches of neutrality or
when a law carries only limited applicability?
A much larger issue is at stake. Called the “fundamental nonpersecution principle
of the First Amendment” by Justice Kennedy56, this means that government cannot
discriminate against a religion in particular or as a whole. Doing so violates Free
Exercise Clause rights and oftentimes, Equal Protection guarantees. This principle is truly
“an argument against religion-sensitive exclusion, not an argument demanding religionbased inclusion.”57

Case precedent is extraordinarily slim58, as the doctrine is widely

regarded as inviolable.

The case of McDaniel v. Paty59 provides one example.

Tennessee legislators barred clergymen from taking office, claiming that this would
safeguard religious freedom and ensure that the clergy tended to their local ministries. No
sympathy came from the Supreme Court. The law was overturned, making the case the
exemplar of religious nondiscrimination. Proactive attorneys and legislators, one hopes,
stop such blatant discrimination from becoming law today.
However, this article attempts to reveal that 37 state constitutions contain
provisions in violation of this sacred principle. Blaine Amendments violate the idea of
nonpersecution because “precisely what” this principle prevents “is invidious religious

55

Id. at 531-2.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993).
57
Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s Laws, 106.
58
Ibid at 524.
59
See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
56
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categorization.”60 Categorical proscriptions that deny religious persons or entities the
ability to speak (as in Massachusetts’ Exclusions) or to act (as in Massachusetts’ AntiAid Amendment) run contrary to nonpersecution. Government may not disenfranchise
entire categories of persons. Few reasons would justify the burden placed upon religious
persons should a state use a Blaine Amendment to further seal the barrier between church
and state. Free Exercise concerns would be implicated, and according to Lukumi, strict
scrutiny results. Braunfield v. Brown, involving an Orthodox Jew’s claims that Sunday
Blue Laws violated his religious rights sheds light on this concept.61 The principle of
nonpersecution prevents laws having the “purpose or effect…to…impede the observance
of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions.”

62

Such

“law[s] [are] constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as
being only indirect.”

IV.

The Instant Case: Wirzburger v. Galvin

Wirzburger v. Galvin involves a relatively simple matter: may Massachusetts
exclude from the initiative process all propositions dealing with religion or attempting to
amend or appeal its Anti-Aid Amendment?63 Petitioners Susan Wirzburger and Rita
Zubricki send their kids to Catholic schools without receiving any subsidy from
Massachusetts. Thus, their taxes pay for a public education which their children do not

60

Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s Laws, 63.

61

Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).

62

Id. at 607.
The Anti-Aid Amendment is located in Article 18 of the Massachusetts state Constitution.

63
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utilize. Financial hardship led them to seek an amendment to Massachusetts’ Anti-Aid
Amendment preventing any state aid from flowing to their children’s private school
education. They began their quest for political change in the forum meant for exactly this
type of citizen proposition—Massachusetts’ initiative process. Susan Wirzburger and
fourteen companions submitted “an initiative petition to the Attorney General to modify
the Anti-Aid Amendment” by adding wording legalizing aid in the form of “loans, grants,
or tax benefits to students attending private schools, regardless of the schools’ religious
affiliation.”64 Judicial precedent as actualized in Everson, Mitchell and Zelman spurred
their hopes. What they request, per se, is entirely constitutional as a sort of indirect
funding funneled through the principle of private choice.65 However, citing the two
exclusions in the section of Massachusetts’ constitution that enables the initiative process
(the Religious Exclusion and the Anti-Aid Exclusion)66, Attorney General Reilly denied
to certify the petition. Petitioners sought and won relief in federal district court in 1999.
More than 800,000 signatures were gathered and the Secretary of the Commonwealth
certified the petition. The next hitch arose when the petition, in accordance with the
judicial mandate, arrived in the Massachusetts’ legislature. Senate Counsel advised the
body not to act on the petition, harkening to Attorney General Reilly’s original stance.
This advice led the senate to ignore the matter and the petition soon died, “as a result of
the barrier posed by the Exclusions.”67 Petitioner Wirzburger and her counsel seek a
simple allowance: let the petition proceed. Aside from any technical argument, this
should comprise the base claim of Petitioner. It is a simple request, easily bogged down
64
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in the complexities of a currently shaky Religion jurisprudence. The beauty of the
Wirzburger case is that it only indirectly implicates an Anti-Aid Amendment. As I shall
soon discuss, Wirzburger is really an issue of Free Speech.
Despite the seeming simplicity of the case and the promise of a stair-step victory,
Petitioner has lost every single stage of the case, save the first injunctive victory. To win,
one must first know why one loses. An examination of the reasons why the Becket Fund
lost in their recent First Circuit hearing holds the secrets necessary to regain lost ground.
Petitioner lost on three grounds in the First Circuit decision of Wirzburger
released on June 24, 2005.68 Judge Torruella denied Petitioner relief on all three chief
claims and grounds: Free Speech, Free Exercise, and Equal Protection.69

Such a

sweeping denial must be carefully analyzed, for Judge Torruella’s arguments are certain
to be repeated in the future. Blaine opponents must ensure that the Supreme Court does
not exercise similar jurisprudence. As discussed, even a single losing case may put to
rest the hopes of defeating Anti-Aid Amendments. Analyzing the First Circuit decision
reveals that the Court acknowledged the restrictions on Wirzburger’s speech in the
initiative process.70 In a shocking twist, however, the Court upheld the restrictions under
the intermediate scrutiny of the O’Brien test.71 Petitioner’s claim that the exclusions
represent content-based speech restrictions was summarily denied. The Court viewed
any burdens upon speech as merely incidental and unrelated to the suppression of free
speech. Petitioner’s claims fared equally poorly in the First Circuit’s Free Exercise
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holding. The court noted, as it danced around the issue, that the “Supreme Court has
stated its reluctance to strike down ‘legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on
the exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make unlawful the religious
practice itself.’”72 Despite the Exclusions’ broad-based categorical and explicit denial of
any political speech dealing with religion, the Court held that these restrictions were only
incidental and furthered Massachusetts’ legitimate interest in deciding the church and
state balance in the legislature alone. Blaine opponents worst fears actualized in Judge
Torruella’s notice that the Supreme Court has previously examined animus in past Free
Exercise cases, although the Court found no such animus in the Locke v. Davey
decision.73 Precedent is already guiding the court away from noticing the anti-Catholic
animus and certainly from acting to end its current manifestations. The First Circuit
realized that animus guided the original 1855 Anti-Aid Amendment but held that
Petitioner failed to prove this same type of animus operating within the 1917-1918
Constitutional Convention.

Judge Torruella neglected the Becket Fund’s expert

witnesses74 that testifying to exactly this truth. Further trouble arises in the court’s Equal
Protection holdings. Clinging to the apparent facial neutrality of the exclusions (that
disallow initiatives both favoring and disfavoring religion), equal protection claims failed
immediately.
An all-encompassing loss like this must never happen again. Tens of thousands
of persons desiring to repeal the discriminatory Blaine Amendments and finally receive
limited aid to fund their children’s private school education cannot be disappointed. The
72
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Becket Fund should recoup its losses by launching a slightly shifted strategy, some of
which I have already presented.
I first note Petitioner’s two claims: (1) to resolve the disagreement among courts
of appeals “over the proper level of scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause of contentbased censorship of political expression in state initiative processes, and (2) to denote
when a law’s facial neutrality proves insufficient to trump restraints imposed upon
citizens’ Free Speech Clause rights and Equal Protection guarantees.75
A simple mantra communicates my message: emphasize fallacious effect, not
fallible intent. Litigants should prevail against the Blaines as a result of their present
operation, without needing to prove overwhelming animus in their passage. Several
constitutional and general principles must be touted, among them: nonpersecution and
the tenets of neutrality and general applicability.

In addition, I do not feel that

Petitioner’s current argument underlines what I call the “harmful uniqueness” of
Massachusetts’ two exclusions. Finally, litigators in Wirzburger should emphasize the
thematic thought presented earlier: let the petition proceed. The argument should be
simple and unburdened by arguments that have little pull in modern jurisprudence.
As much as I seem to critique the Becket Fund, I applaud much of their efforts.76
They do a superb job of re-creating the anti-Catholic animus that enlivened not only the
1855 Anti-Aid Amendment, but the 1917-1918 Constitutional Convention revisions
(including the two exclusions) that grew and safeguarded it.77
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substantiate the need to peer beyond mere facial neutrality in matters of religious
legislation. Using Lukumi and other cases, the Becket Fund builds an argument that was
unfortunately ignored by Judge Torruella and the First Circuit. Past briefs display the
soundness of Petitioners’ claims that the Massachusetts’ exclusions suppress
communicative conduct78 and thus harm not only Free Speech, but Free Expression as
well. I now refract the issues on which Petitioner’s argument must improve through the
prism of four constitutional provisions, each of which is either directly or indirectly at
issue: Establishment Clause, Free Exercise Clause, Free Speech Clause, and Equal
Protection.

V.

The Arguments as Viewed Through a Constitutional Prism: The Cornerstone of
Wirzburger and Future Anti-Aid Initiatives

The Establishment Clause is an odd place to begin this argumentative analysis.
However, if this issue is not properly understood, all others will fail. Indeed, the very
idea of the Establishment Clause being applied to the states is awkward in itself. Justice
Black’s decision in Everson, with its separationist dicta, may have established the
separation of church and state but it did so in the face of 150 years of contrary historical
precedent. As Yale Professor Akhil Amar notes,79 the Establishment Clause was never
intended to be incorporated to the states. The First Amendment’s construction limits the

opinion, the First Circuit misapplied the summary judgment standard.” See Charles L. Glenn, The Myth of
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powers of the federal government, while safeguarding those of the states.80 Perhaps this
is a non-issue, but this awareness speaks to the relationship that the Establishment Clause
shares with the Free Exercise Clause. Once again, Everson provides grounding for a
discussion of the inherent tension existing between the two clauses.

“New Jersey

[cannot] contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which teaches the
tenets and faith of any church.

On the other hand, other language of the [First]

Amendment commands that New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of
their own religion.”81
Justice Black’s words provide a helpful framework for analyzing the arguments
for and against the Blaine Amendments’ attempts to strictly separate church and state. In
favor of the rigid separation were (and are) many overt secularists who, as Professor
Noah Feldman describes, perceived secularism as a near religion in itself.82 Siding with
anti-Catholic nativists, an odd bond formed that worked to grant states wide latitude in
defining church-state relationships. However, these efforts were plagued by a perennial
problem with which legislators must deal—being overbroad. The Blaine Amendments
are incredibly overbroad, impeding upon persons Free Exercise Clause rights in favor of
maintaining a wholly secular, fortress-like, state funding system. Arguments against the
establishment aims of the Blaines are quite strong. Scholars Lupu and Tuttle concede
that, “Over the past fifteen years, the prophylactic character of strict separationism has
been under siege.”83 Certainly, court precedent as catalyzed in Mitchell and Zelman
80
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indicate the judiciary’s willingness to adhere to the evolving principle of neutrality and
general applicability. Blaine Amendments are repulsive to these principles, as their facial
neutrality conceals the vigor of their discriminatory effects.
Petitioner’s refusal to implicate the Establishment Clause in Wirzburger is
certainly wise. Though it is a non-issue here, other cases will certainly offer a direct
attack on this constitutional provision, claming that the Blaines are not narrowly tailored
and are overbroad in their nature and efficacy. Past court decisions generally fail to grant
a “personal right” to citizens under the penumbra of the Establishment Clause, unlike the
right garnered in the Free Exercise Clause. Present Judicial examinations search for
compulsion or coercion on the part of the state, regarding religious practices or beliefs.
Thus, it is prudent to let other cases better answer this issue.
Thankfully, Petitioner does not leave Free Exercise Clause claims out of the
picture in Wirzburger v. Galvin. Their arguments here tend to be purposed and even
powerful. The Becket Fund undoubtedly realizes that it has a golden free exercise case,
as,
The most common problem respecting free exercise of religion has involved a
generally applicable government regulation, whose purpose is nonreligious, that
either makes illegal (or otherwise burdens) conduct that is dictated by some
religious belief, or requires (or otherwise encourages) conduct that is forbidden by
some religious belief.84
These words lead well into a brief discussion of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence. The
already discussed case of Cantwell v. Connecticut further defined the Clause and
incorporated it to the states. The Court held that the Free Exercise clause “embraces two
84
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concepts,--freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but, in the nature
of things, the second cannot be.”85 The “freedom to act” may only be regulated in ways
that do not “unduly…infringe” upon the “protected freedom.”86 Would a state measure
proscribing a citizen to place a matter dealing with religion on the state initiative ballot
(itself a forum of protected speech) constitute an undue infringement upon Free Exercise
rights? It certainly seems so.
Noting this, the analysis moves to a discussion of ground that the Petitioner must
re-conquer should Wirzburger come before the High Court. It must be established that a
law’s facial neutrality is no saving grace. Substantial guidance on this issue may be
derived from the Court’s holding in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission.87
The court, citing an earlier case88, affirmed that,
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct
proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of
conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion
exists (emphasis mine).89
For example, were a Massachusetts citizen to seek the legalization of peyote for religious
purposes through the state initiative process, the Religious Exclusion would
automatically proscribe his or her action. However, should he or she seek the peyote’s
legalization for a merely secular purpose (such as for medicinal uses), the petition could
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proceed. Petitioners are thus forced to choose between airing their true motivations or
worse yet, changing or altogether abrogating their Free Exercise rights.90 It is an
untenable—and an unconstitutional—choice. Here one views the sort of facially neutral
regulation Justice O’Connor describes in her concurring opinion in Smith. Should laws,
even those neutral at face value, “unduly burden[] the free exercise of religion,” they
violate the principle of neutrality.91
The Justices’ words speak to the reality that special burdens, like those imposed
by the Massachusetts’ Exclusions, may not be based upon religious views or status.92
Indeed, “[a]bsent the most unusual circumstances, one’s religion ought not to affect one’s
legal rights or benefits.”93

But what if government regulations, despite a neutral

appearance, impose such unique harms? As the Court noted in Lukumi, “[f]acial
neutrality is not determinative.”94 A judicial inquiry must be made, analyzing the law’s
present efficacy (such as I argue in this paper), whether it is narrowly tailored, and its
original legislative intent.95

The Becket Fund carries this argument effectively,

demonstrating that Massachusetts’ initiative process closes the door on religious persons
seeking political accommodations from the “burdens of neutral, generally applicable
laws.”96 Thus, Petitioners bring the argument full circle to encompass the principles of
neutrality and general applicability that this paper so strongly encourages. In addition to
this relative strength of the Petitioner’s argument in Wirzburger, I also suggest noting
what Frederick Mark Gedicks entitles the “negative right” born of governmental
90
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neutrality.97 Religious entities and persons, by this accord, are only free from added
restraints on their involvement in the appropriation of state monies.98 A positive right,
the right to receive state funds, is not granted by the neutrality principle. The idea that
petitioner Wirzburger does not seek the guarantee of either the passage of her amendment
or moreover, the guaranteed disbursement of Massachusetts’ funds, adds credence to her
claims.
The foregoing arguments disclose the reality that the Wirzburger petitioners’
rights have been abrogated by facially neutral laws that operate in a discriminatory
manner.

Wirzburger’s religious motivations serve as the basis for Massachusetts’

restriction of her Free Exercise Clause rights. Injunctive relief should be granted and her
petition should be allowed to proceed.
The next tier of argumentation analyzes the Equal Protection claims presented in
Wirzburger v. Galvin and anti-Blaine litigation in general. The Lukumi Court found the
Free Exercise Clause and Equal Protection clause to be interrelated.99 Noting this, I
suggest a shift in Wirzburger’s argument. Petitioners touted the lessons garnered from
the anti-discrimination cases, Hunter v. Erickson and Washington v. Seattle School
District in the writ to the Supreme Court.100 These cases comprise the cornerstone of
Petitioner’s equal protection claims. Judge Torruella thoroughly dismisses this argument
in the First Circuit decision, seeming to say that the modern judiciary is unready and
unwilling to beckon in a new era of race-like anti-discrimination cases. Future litigants
may not be able to affix anti-Blaine cases as followers in the line leading from Brown
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onward. A new path must be paved, and as Locke v. Davey illustrates, the path must not
lead through the craggy rocks of past discrimination but to the smooth fields of present
efficacy. This is not to say that Petitioners should drop their references to these cases, but
only to be keenly aware (as they likely are) of the potential fallibility of these claims. In
all honesty, the Becket Fund may be able to afford a failure in their Equal Protection
arguments. However, they cannot afford any failures in the argument of the next
constitutional provision, Free Speech.
Certainly, the chief issue in Wirzburger is not Article 18 (the Anti-Aid
Amendment)101 of the Massachusetts Constitution—it is Article 48 (enabling the
initiative process, while disabling initiatives dealing with religion or the repeal of the
Anti-Aid Amendment). As a step to eventual anti-Blaine victory, Wirzburger should
(and largely has) clung to this issue, incidental as it may be to the Anti-Aid Amendments
at large. Cases at this point, to indulge in metaphor, should not attack Rome itself (the
Blaine Amendments), but attack instead the smaller cities that surround it (such as
Massachusetts’ protectionist exclusions). Only the strength of amalgamated victories
will pave the path to a final triumph.
The efficacy of the Becket Fund’s current Free Speech argument must then be
evaluated. I suggest that the fund does well here, but could enhance the effectiveness of
their argumentation.

This paper already noted the Becket Fund’s brilliant example

illustrating the inability of Massachusetts’ citizens to acknowledge the religious
motivations of desired state initiatives.102

101
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relegated to the footnotes. Such an evocative argument should comprise a central tenet of
Petitioner’s argument, as it emphasizes the disparate treatment Wirzburger is receiving
and the content-based nature of the exclusions restrictions.
Petitioner’s Free Speech argument as applied to Massachusetts’ initiative process,
should aim to achieve three objectives: (1) the initiative process represents protected
speech, (2) these restrictions warrant strict scrutiny, and (3) the harmful uniqueness of the
exclusions merits a harsh rendering of any governmental interest supposed by
Massachusetts. To begin the analysis, the Becket Fund convincingly presents the nature
of the exclusion’s content-based restrictions. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service
Commission103 perhaps represents their strongest argument to this end. According to the
case, “[c]ontent-based restrictions on speech triggering strict scrutiny are those that either
prohibit speech on an entire subject or topic, or prohibit particular viewpoints on an
otherwise includible subject.”104 This point is elucidated by the case closely mirroring
the instant case, Meyer v. Grant.105 Colorado banned any payment to initiative petition
circulators from individuals or organizations. The Supreme Court first harangued and
then struck down the restriction, stating that it represented content-based suppression of
free speech. In towering language, the Court noted that initiative speech “is at the core of
our electoral process and of the First Amendment Freedoms.”106

Furthermore, the

initiative process is an “area of public policy where protection of robust discussion is at
its zenith.”107

To no fault of the Becket Fund, Judge Torruella distinguished the

invalidated legislation in Meyer as far different from that in Wirzburger. Au contraire,
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Meyer represents only a slight and indirect burden on the initiative process;
Massachusetts’ Religious Exclusion proscribes an entire category of speech from the
initiative process. A greater difference could not be had. Should Wirzburger’s writ be
accepted, I believe that the case will turn on this distinction. Yes, a state has wide
latitude in defining its relationship between the church and the state. Yet a state cannot—
and indeed, must not—deny public discussion of such a fundamentally important issue as
religion.108 The mere existence of alternative avenues of discussion does not excuse
Massachusetts’ abominable exclusions, for the “power to ban initiatives entirely does not
include the power to limit discussion of political issues raised in initiative petitions.”109
Surely First Amendment freedoms cannot be marginalized or compartmentalized
based upon the animus-aimed restrictions of a single state. First Amendment freedoms
allow the chance to speak, and as shown, act freely without fear of governmental reprisal.
The instant case acts nearly analogously to prior restraint provisions that pre-censor
speech before it hits the public forum. The First Amendment’s stance on such issues is
clear. Broadly tailored provisions such as the Religious and Anti-Aid exclusions act as
unconstitutional infringements on petitioner’s free speech rights. This argument should
be waged with vigor, for if won, future cases may begin to argue against the present
discriminatory efficacy of the Blaine Amendments.
The discrimination inherent in the Massachusetts’ exclusions garners a “harmful
uniqueness,” when one considers that out of 27 states with initiative processes,
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Massachusetts is the only state that completely proscribes religion.110 This is akin to
Massachusetts retaining vestigial laws during the 1960s that disallowed initiatives on the
ballot attempting to speak of race.111 Initiatives could favor or disfavor race, but the
intent of the restrictions would be clear—the legislators would wish to limit the free
speech of persons seeking increased racial equity. The overly simplistic argument that
the legislature wished to handle this subject itself fails a sub-facial examination. Not only
would it fail a sub-facial examination, but it would—and must—fail a present efficacy
examination. The Becket Fund notes a point that should entirely damn the two exclusions
at issue in Wirzburger: the “discriminatory impact” and the selective enforcement of the
Anti-Aid Amendment and its safeguarding exclusions.112 Firstly, the 1917-1918
widening of Article 18 to apply to all sectarian institutions serves only as an un-enforced
parchment barrier. Not a “single example of a non-public, non-school entity” being
denied funding due to the expanded Amendment exists.113 In fact, fifty examples depict
the Commonwealth’s explicit funding of noticeably sectarian institutions that are not
schools. Thus, Massachusetts has reverted to the intent and effect of the original and
animus-enlivened 1855 Anti-Aid Amendment. The revealing decision of Helmes v.
Commonwealth114 in the state Supreme Court illustrates this disturbing reality. Herein,
the court authorized funding to a private charitable group in direct violation of the
expanded Anti-Aid Amendment. A redefining of the Amendment served as the cloak for
this move, with the court proclaiming the need for the Amendment to be “consistent with
110
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its original focus”—its original focus of overt anti-Catholic discrimination.115 Certainly,
the case of past animus in Massachusetts’ is more visible than perhaps in any other state.
Yet it is the present operation of this Anti-Aid Amendment, as shown through the Helmes
decision and the instances of illegal appropriations that will condemn this discriminatory
amendment and others to come
If any tendency stands in the way of Wirzburger and future anti-Blaine litigation,
it is the Court’s propensity to resort to judicial deference, as seen in Locke v. Davey. It is
far easier to simply keep a closed door closed than open it. This article argues that only
by showcasing the discriminatory effect of the Blaines and especially of the two
Massachusetts exclusions, can the door be unlocked to reveal the discriminatory intent of
these amendments.

VI.

Conclusion

America and its states certainly fail to achieve perfection. The sins of days past
(such as the 1855 Anti-Aid Amendment promulgated by the nativist Massachusetts
Know-Nothings), scar those of the present (as evidenced by petitioner Susan
Wirzburger’s inability to receive even limited and indirect funding to alleviate the burden
of subsidizing two separate educations). The case of Wirzburger v. Galvin, presently on a
writ to the Supreme Court, must be accepted and the case won. Failure would exact
detrimental consequences to the ability of religious persons and organizations to receive
relief from facially neutral and generally applicable laws.

The Becket Fund argues the

case persuasively, but their ideas could gain more power when garnered by a different
115
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emphasis. Future arguments in this case and others like it must harken to a modern
evaluation of the Blaines. Attorneys and plaintiffs alike must fight, not the ghosts of the
past, but the spirits of the present. Anti-Blaine litigation should not require a religious
liberties historian, only an Attorney well-versed in the principle of nonpersecution and its
tenets of non-exemption, neutrality and general applicability. Should these doctrinal
mandates be viewed through the lense of the Free Speech Clause (especially in
Wirzburger), the Free Exercise Clause, and Equal Protection guarantees, victory becomes
increasingly likely.
Arguments against the Blaines must focus on their unconstitutional purpose: “to
exclude religious persons and groups from the equal enjoyment of public benefits.”116
Wirzburger represents the next proverbial step in the long march to legal success. The
Becket Fund must be supported in this battle. Furthermore, their arguments must ensure
the long-term efficacy of anti-Blaine litigation in a post-Locke legal environment.
Specifically speaking, the fund should highlight the completely constitutional nature of
Susan Wirzburger’s request to receive burden-reducing financial aid for her children’s
private schooling, whether religious or not. The Religious Exclusion and the Anti-Aid
Exclusion should be taken for what they are—archaic and prohibitory measures that
obstruct the ability of the Petitioner to achieve beneficial legislation or to discuss her
matter in the larger political sphere. As the Becket Fund proclaims, her rights have been
denied and her civil liberties trumped—all as a result of her desire to act out of her
religious beliefs and give her children a meaningful, religious education. Truly, her
petition must proceed.
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Yet even if her petition does proceed, pushed along by a Supreme Court mandate,
only a battle and not the war would be won. It is efficacy, not intent, that will define
future Blaine battles. Should this advice be noted, the paramount case of Wirzburger v.
Galvin will be won and the discrimination enshrined in thirty-seven state Blaine
Amendments’ finally erased.

